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ABSTRACT
Pei, Kexin M.S., Purdue University, May 2016. Bridging Statistical Learning and
Formal Reasoning for Cyber Attack Detection. Major Professors: Dongyan Xu,
Xiangyu Zhang and Luo Si.
Current cyber-infrastructures are facing increasingly stealthy attacks that implant
malicious payloads under the cover of benign programs. Current attack detection
approaches based on statistical learning methods may generate misleading decision
boundaries when processing noisy data with such a mixture of benign and malicious
behaviors. On the other hand, attack detection based on formal program analysis
may lack completeness or adaptivity when modeling attack behaviors. In light of
these limitations, we have developed LEAPS, an attack detection system based on
supervised statistical learning to classify benign and malicious system events. Fur-
thermore, we leverage control flow graphs inferred from the system event logs to
enable automatic pruning of the training data, which leads to a more accurate clas-
sification model when applied to the testing data. Our extensive evaluation shows
that, compared with pure statistical learning models, LEAPS achieves consistently




Enterprise cyberinfrastructures are facing more severe cyber threats powered by
sophisticated attack techniques. Such attacks are driven by financial interests for
divulging privacy records, collecting competitor’s intelligence, or concealing unau-
thorized system accesses. They may exploit system vulnerabilities or leverage social
engineering (i.e., psychological manipulation of innocent people to perform harmful
operations unintentionally) to initiate attacks, leaving only inconspicuous footprints.
More recently, instead of only launching one-time attacks, adversaries tend to implant
stealthy and persistent backdoors — which parasitize in the memory space of some
long-running benign applications or embed in the application’s binaries — to facili-
tate future security penetrations. Based on the cloaking properties of such attacks,
in this paper we call them camouflaged attacks.
Recent research efforts on host-based attack detection can be divided into two
categories: program analysis based methods and statistical learning based methods.
Attack Detection Based on Program Analysis: Some approaches [1–5] perform
static analysis on applications (assuming the availability of source or executable code)
to obtain precise program execution models. But the non-trivial overhead, complex-
ity of accurate binary analysis, and intentional obfuscation limit their applicability
to real-world applications/environments. Other detection systems [6–8] perform dy-
namic analysis in a training phase and build deterministic program behavior models
by profiling application-system interactions.
Attack Detection Based on Statistical Learning Instead of achieving precise pro-
gram models like in the former category, detection systems in this category utilize
statistical learning techniques to build benign/malicious classification models. For
2example, in the work of [9, 10], association and frequency rules are learned from
training data for future detection. In other systems [11, 12], histogram-based meth-
ods are applied to profiling normal program behavior. A more sophisticated hidden
Markov model (HMM) is adopted in [13, 14] for intrusion detection. More recently,
the works in [15–18] utilize Support Vector Machine (SVM) to build binary classifica-
tion models. One major advantage of these statistical learning based systems is that
they are robust in dealing with incomplete data, and thus can usually achieve better
classification results compared with program analysis based approaches.
We argue that, for the detection of camouflaged attacks, current attack detection
systems may encounter difficulties in effectively discriminating between benign and
malicious behavior. The main reason is that the extraction of pure malicious behavior
in a raw dataset (e.g., system execution logs) is difficult. For trojaned applications
or runtime application exploitations belonging to camouflaged attacks, the malicious
payload no longer executes independently. Instead, it runs concurrently with the
benign code of the application, which generates a training dataset with interleaved
benign and malicious behaviors. Such noisy training datasets may eventually lead to
a biased classification boundary.
In light of the limitation above, we have developed LEAPS1 to integrate the
capabilities of the two camps. LEAPS is inspired by a recently proposed vision
called “Learn-2-Reason” [19], which promotes mutual enhancement between statis-
tical learning and formal analysis methods. Specifically, LEAPS leverages program
execution analysis to refine its statistical learning model, boosting its detection accu-
racy.
Taking a host-based system event log as input, we adopt the supervised statistical
learning model to classify benign and malicious events. The classification model is
built upon system-level features extracted from the log, such as system event, libraries,
and functions. The effectiveness of this approach is based on the key observation that
1LEAPS stands for Learning Enhanced with Analysis of Program Support
3the system-level behavior of anomalous execution, triggered by the malicious code, is
different from the system-level behavior of benign code.
Then, to address the noisy training dataset problem in detecting camouflaged
attacks, we use the control flow graph (CFG) of each benign application (which may
not be complete) as the oracle to guide the training. From our observation, benign
and malicious instructions by nature cluster separately in the memory space. For
each data point in the noisy training dataset, we measure its distance to the benign
CFG and assign a corresponding weight, which indicates that outlying data points
are more likely to be events triggered by the malicious payload. Although injecting
malicious code near benign code is not impossible (e.g., injecting malicious code in
free alignment areas between procedures), it is usually not used in real-world attacks
because such limited space greatly restricts the functionality of injected code. Typical
attacks choose to allocate extra memory for malicious payloads and then hijack benign
control flows.
Taking the assigned weights into consideration, we build a Weighted Support Vec-
tor Machine (WSVM) classifier to detect benign and malicious behaviors. Deriving
a complete and accurate CFG using static analysis on a binary is a well-known chal-
lenge due to binary obfuscation and software protection mechanism. In LEAPS, we
avoid static program analysis by dynamically inferring the CFG of each application
— based on the stack walk trace in the system event log. We note that such a CFG is
by no means complete, but it presents a general execution pattern of the application,
which is sufficient for our distance approximation.
1.2 Contributions
I model the intrusion anomalies via formal static/dynamic program analysis and
causality reasoning techniques. These techniques tend to perform better in (1) achiev-
ing high accuracy, with low false positive and false negative rates; (2) tracing back
and reasoning about system/program behavior to understand how a detected attack
4starts and reaches the current state. However, today’s attack strategy and design
of malware evolve to be more stealthy and complex, which produces a huge volume
of data to be analyzed. The efficiency and performance of fine-grained causality
analysis inherently suffer from the Big-Data problem, such as non-trivial overhead,
dependency explosion that results in non-determinism.
My machine learning research aims to leverage and adapt effective learning algo-
rithms with theoretical guarantees to handle different big data analysis problems in
security. The learning-based approach performs better in (1) monitoring and detect-
ing signs of attacks in real time and at the early stage of an attack; (2) detecting zero-
day attacks with no existing signatures. We aim to make statistical learning work
side-by-side with formal reasoning by influencing, interacting and hence improving
each other to achieve the best of the two camps and mitigate their limitations.
This dissertation makes the following contributions:
• A better statistical learning model for detecting camouflaged attacks, guided by
CFGs derived from program trace analysis. This model is especially suitable
for noisy training datasets mixed with benign/malicious events.
• An algorithm for CFG inference only based on the stack walk trace in the system
event log, without requiring static program analysis or program instrumenta-
tion.
• Extensive evaluation of LEAPS for the detection of camouflaged attacks with
diverse combinations of applications, malicious payloads, and attack methods,
demonstrating effectiveness of LEAPS.
1.3 Dissertation Organization
Here we give an outline of this dissertation: Chapter 1 explains the unique ad-
vantages that can be brought by bridging statistical learning and formal reasoning in
intrusion detection. Then we present the main contributions of our framework in de-
5tecting Trojan malware. Chapter 2 presents the threat model and the overview of the
workflow. Chapter 3 provides the system design of LEAPS and Chapter 4 presents
implementation details. Chapter 5 shows extensive evaluation of LEAPS in different
attack scenarios. Chapter 6 discusses current limitations and proposes future work.
Chapter 7 describes related work and we conclude in Chapter 8.
62 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we first discuss the threat model and the attacks we target. Then we
present the general workflow of LEAPS and give a brief introduction of the function-
ality of each component.
2.1 Threat Model
We assume that the adversaries have already found a way to infiltrate the system.
They may achieve this through physical access to a target computer, e.g., manually
replacing an application with a trojaned version, or using some social engineering
techniques to trick innocent users to click some malicious web sites or open a disguised
attachment in a phishing email. They may also remotely exploit some unpatched
vulnerabilities and then implant a backdoor into some long-running benign program.
We do not intend to use LEAPS to raise an alarm at the time of intrusion, instead
we aim to detect the anomalous behavior and backtrack to its entry point when
the remote adversary performs malicious actions through the persistent backdoor
implanted in the system.
In this paper we focus on camouflaged attacks, which run under the cover of
some benign program. This is a common technique to make malicious behavior more
difficult to detect. Finally, we require that system event logging function be turned
on so that it can generate program execution traces as input to our analysis.
2.2 Workflow of LEAPS
Similar to traditional anomaly detection systems, we divide the workflow of LEAPS
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Figure 2.1. The workflow of the Training Phase of LEAPS, the testing
phase is not included
2.2.1 Training Phase
We illustrate the workflow of the Training Phase in Figure 2.1. Here we give a
brief description of each component and its input data format.
The initial input data consist of raw log files generated by the system event logging
engine. Event logging systems are commonly equipped in modern operating systems
for diagnosing application performance problems, thus they are able to walk the ap-
plication stacks to backtrack execution when system events are captured. These raw
system event log files are recorded in a controlled environment and will be used as
training data. The benign raw log is generated when we execute a clean version of an
application; whereas the mixed raw log is generated when the parasitic malicious pay-
load (embedded in the binary or injected through remote exploitation) and the benign
application code run in the same process context, leading to interleaved execution of
benign and malicious code.
Our Raw Log Parser is similar to the front end of Introperf [20]. We parse the
raw log file, correlate stack walk traces with corresponding system events, and extract
function and library information sliced for each process in both the user and kernel
space. The output, which we term stack-event correlated log, consists of itemized
system events for the application of interest. Moreover, each event is attached with
its stack walk trace annotated with libraries and functions.
The Stack Partition Module is for splitting the stack walk trace of each event
into two parts, application stack trace and system stack trace. Application stack trace
8consists of the stack walk within the application itself. We use this to infer the ap-
plication’s CFG because it contains both explicit and implicit execution information.
System stack trace consists of stack walk trace in the shared libraries and the op-
erating system (OS) kernel. We note that the differences in system-level behavior
(e.g., system events, shared libraries, and library/kernel functions) are best suited
for distinguishing the benign functionality from the malicious functionality. Thus we
extract features used by the statistical learning model from the system stack trace in
the system event log.
The Data Preprocessing Module extracts features from the system stack trace.
Here we apply hierarchical clustering to group the functions and libraries into clusters.
This generates both the benign dataset and the mixed dataset, which are ready to be
used by the statistical machine learning engine.
The Control Flow Graph Inference Module builds the CFG of the application by
inspecting the application stack trace. We construct two CFGs separately from the
benign application stack trace and the mixed application stack trace. Then we compare
these two CFGs to measure the distance of each execution path in the mixed CFG to
the benign CFG. As we can map each execution path to its affiliated system event, we
assign a weight (computed based on the distances of all execution paths attached to
this event) to each event in the mixed dataset (generated by the Data Preprocessing
Module) and generate a weighted dataset.
Our Supervised Statistical Learning Module is a unified learning system for build-
ing the benign/malicious classifier. We employ a Weighted Support Vector Machine,
which is a binary classification model, to obtain the classifier based on the training
data generated from the Data Preprocessing Module. We treat the data in the benign
dataset as the positive samples in the statistical learning model, while the data in the
weighted mixed dataset are viewed as the negative samples. We can apply the learned
benign/malicious classifier to detect attacks from production system logs.
92.2.2 Testing Phase
After the Training Phase, we have generated application-wise binary classifiers
from the training data. In the Testing Phase, first we perform application slicing
on the system event log (same as in the Training Phase) to generate the testing
data. Then we apply the classification models (targeting different application/payload
combinations) to the testing data for detection.
We point out that we use the application-wise binary classifier only for the conve-
nience of evaluation. When applied to attack detection in real situations, LEAPS can




Following the workflow in the previous section, we now highlight some key techniques
we have developed for LEAPS and describe the algorithms behind them.
3.1 Data Preprocessing
Data preprocessing is the essential step before applying any statistical learning
model. It requires domain knowledge to interpret the raw data, extract distinguish-
ing features for classification, and discretize these features to be ready as the input
to statistical learning. Because the statistical learning model is general and not spe-
cific to our raw data, data preprocessing is critical to the effectiveness of the final
classification model generated.
In LEAPS, we choose to use system events and information in their correlated
system-level stack traces to characterize the program behavior being executed. As
mentioned in Chapter 2, after parsing the raw log file, we are able to correlate the
stack walk traces with their corresponding system events. Stack walk trace entries
contain the function invocations leading to this event from the application. Then we
partition the stack trace and only select the system stack trace and system events as
input to the data preprocessing module.
Each entry in the system stack trace contains both the library and function in-
formation. We aggregate the libraries and functions of each event and generate a
3-tuple entry: {Event Type, Lib, Func}. Event Type stands for the type of this sys-
tem event. Lib and Func stand for the set of libraries and functions in the system
stack trace of this event. Event Type is well defined in the system, and thus can be
naturally mapped to the integer space. For Lib and Func, we leverage hierarchical
11
@107: EventType=SysCallEnter EventDataLength=8 SysCallAddress=0xfffff9600016e138<win32k.sys!NtUserWaitMessage+0x0> 
            #0: StackAddress=0xfffff80001a7d3c5 ImageName="ntoskrnl.exe" OffsetToImage=0x713c5<ntoskrnl.exe!KiSystemServiceExit>
            #1: StackAddress=0x757a2dd9 ImageName="wow64cpu.dll" OffsetToImage=0x2dd9<wow64cpu.dll!CpupSyscallStub>
            #2: StackAddress=0x757a2d92 ImageName="wow64cpu.dll" OffsetToImage=0x2d92<wow64cpu.dll!Thunk0Arg>
            #3: StackAddress=0x7581d07e ImageName="wow64.dll" OffsetToImage=0xd07e<wow64.dll!RunCpuSimulation>
            #4: StackAddress=0x7581c549 ImageName="wow64.dll" OffsetToImage=0xc549<wow64.dll!Wow64LdrpInitialize>
            #5: StackAddress=0x77b684c8 ImageName="ntdll.dll" OffsetToImage=0x484c8<ntdll.dll!LdrpInitializeProcess>
            #6: StackAddress=0x77b67623 ImageName="ntdll.dll" OffsetToImage=0x47623<ntdll.dll! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'>
            #7: StackAddress=0x77b5308e ImageName="ntdll.dll" OffsetToImage=0x3308e<ntdll.dll!LdrInitializeThunk>
            #8: StackAddress=0x771a438d ImageName="user32.dll" OffsetToImage=0x2438d<user32.dll!NtUserWaitMessage>
            #17: StackAddress=0x77d39d72 ImageName="ntdll.dll" OffsetToImage=0x39d72<ntdll.dll!__RtlUserThreadStart>
            #18: StackAddress=0x77d39d45 ImageName="ntdll.dll" OffsetToImage=0x39d45<ntdll.dll!_RtlUserThreadStart>
Event_Num  Event_Type   Lib   Func
        @107                7                2       40
Hierarchical Clustering
Figure 3.1. The result of conducting hierarchical clustering on a system
event
clustering [21] to group similar library/function sets into one cluster. We use set
dissimilarity as the metric to calculate a pairwise distance matrix, DM , as follows:
DM[i][j] = set dissimilarity(i, j) = 1− ‖seti ∩ setj‖‖seti ∪ setj‖ (3.1)
We utilize this pairwise distance matrix in the hierarchical clustering model to obtain
optimal clusters. Finally we replace Lib and Func in the 3-tuple entry with its
corresponding cluster number and Event Type with the integer based on its event
type. Figure 3.1 gives a concrete example of preprocessing a SysCallEnter event and
its 3-tuple entry result. We use these discretized 3-tuple entries as the input data to
the statistical learning model.
3.2 Control Flow Graph Inference
In our approach, we need the CFG of the benign application execution as an or-
acle to process the log mixed with the benign and malicious execution. While CFGs
of binary executables can be acquired using static or dynamic analysis, generating
CFGs statically from binaries is challenging due to various difficulties such as identi-
















Figure 3.2. The illustration of the Control Flow Graph inference process
loaded libraries, obfuscation, binary packing, and the impracticality of instrumenting
real world binaries to collect fine grained dynamic execution information. Hence,
we decide to derive CFGs only from the application stack trace extracted from the
system event log. While the completeness of the inferred CFG is dependent on the
frequency of the system events and the exercised functionality when logging is en-
abled, it is sufficient to produce an incomplete CFG that can approximately reflect
the general execution structure of the application. As we will show later, we leverage
a heuristic algorithm to predict the missing parts of the benign CFGs and recognize
malicious payloads that do not belong to the original benign graphs. Therefore, a
unique advantage of LEAPS is that it only relies on the system log, without analyzing
the binaries.
We give a concrete example in Figure 3.2. For each individual event, there is an
application stack trace attached to it. There are two events shown in this figure. For
Event 1, the application stack trace starts from Addr 1 to Addr 5. Event 2 is the
subsequent event and its stack trace becomes different from Event 1 after Addr 3,
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which invokes Addr 6 and Addr 7. We are able to identify two types of control flow
within the application stack trace. We call the first type of control flow an explicit
path, which indicates the function invocations in the stack trace. For example, the
execution path from Addr 1 to Addr 2 is an explicit path. We call the other type
of control flow an implicit path, which we infer from stack traces of two adjacent
events. In Figure 3.2, Addr 3 invokes Addr 4 in Event 1 and Addr 6 in Event 2,
which indicates there is a control flow from Addr 4 to Addr 6 in the program. Based
on these two criteria, we build the CFG incrementally by enumerating all events and
their application stack traces.
Algorithm 1 Control Flow Graph Inference
Input: funcentry ← gen cfg
ast ← stack trace file
cfg ← empty dict
1: procedure addto cfg(cfg, start, end)
2: if cfg.haskey(start) then
3: cfg[start].add(end)
4: else
5: cfg[start] := set([end])
6: procedure branch point(prev stacklist, curr stacklist)
7: index := common prefix len(prev stacklist, curr stacklist)
8: return index
9: procedure gen cfg(ast, cfg)
10: while line do
11: if isEvent(line) then
12: branchidx := branch point(prev stacklist, curr stacklist)
13: addto cfg(cfg, prev stacklist[branchidx], curr stacklist[branchidx])
14: for i ∈ [0, len(stacklist)-1] do
15: addto cfg(cfg, curr stacklist[i], curr stacklist[i+1])
16: prev stacklist := curr stacklist
17: curr stacklist.clear()
18: else if isStack(line) then
19: funcaddr := extract funcaddr(line)
20: curr stacklist.push(funcaddr)
21: line := ast.readline()
We present the detailed algorithm in Algorithm 1. In Line 12, we find the branch
point by comparing two adjacent stack traces and add the implicit path in Line 13.
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(1) Vim Benign Control Flow Graph
(2) Vim Mixed Control Flow Graph (with Reverse TCP Shell as Payload)
Similar Subgraph
Anomalous Subgraph
Figure 3.3. Comparison of (1) Vim benign CFG and (2) Vim mixed CFG
In Line 15, we add the explicit paths for all the function invocations within one stack
trace.
We apply this CFG inference algorithm on both the benign application stack trace
and the mixed application stack trace. Thus we are able to generate two CFGs.
Figure 3.3-(1) shows the CFG of a benign execution of Vim, whereas Figure 3.3-(2)
shows the CFG of a trojaned Vim that contains the malicious payload of a Reverse
TCP Shell. By comparing these two CFGs (e.g., aligning nodes with the same address
in two graphs), it is not difficult to identify that the left subgraph of the Vim mixed
CFG is similar to the Vim benign CFG because both use the benign functionality of
Vim. But the right subgraph of the Vim mixed CFG is unique, indicating that this
is more likely to be from the anomalous execution caused by the malicious payload.
We point out that, although the CFG alone may be used as a attack signature for
detection, it is not robust enough when encountering polymorphic malware in the real
world. This is the reason we introduce the statistical learning model for a behavior-
based attack detection system.
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3.3 Weight Assessment
With the inferred benign CFG, we aim to assess the degree of “benignity” for
each event in the mixed dataset. We show the algorithm for the weight assessment in
Algorithm 2.
The input to this algorithm is the benign CFG and the mixed CFG inferred from
the application stack traces. When building the CFG from the mixed application stack
trace, we also create a reverse mapping, named memap in Algorithm 2’s input, from
the program path to the event number.
We start by iterating each program path in the mixed CFG. We check whether the
start and end vertices of this path are also connected in the benign CFG. If they are
connected, we assign 1 to the weight (whose range is [0, 1]) for this path. Otherwise,
it means this path does not exist in the benign CFG.
As mentioned before, the inferred CFG is not complete. It is possible that some
paths in the mixed CFG are benign, but missing in the benign CFG due to its in-
completeness. For example, some additional benign functionality might be executed
and recorded in the mixed system log, but not in the benign system log. In order
to address this problem, we create a density array by inserting all the addresses of
nodes appearing in the benign CFG. For any path that is not in the benign CFG, if
it is in the range of this density array, we estimate its weight based on its normalized
distance to the closest nodes in the benign CFG. For all other paths that exceed the
boundary of the density array, we assign 0 as its weight. This weight assessment
approach is based on the observation that code close to the benign code is more likely
to be benign and code far away from the benign code is more likely to be malicious.
That is also the reason why LEAPS can tolerate the incompleteness of the inferred
CFG.
With the weight for each program path in the mixed CFG, we search the reverse
mapping memap to find its corresponding event number. Each event may have mul-
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tiple paths mapped. We compute the weight of each event by averaging all its paths’
weights.
3.4 Binary Classification Model
The building of the benign/malicious classification model is a key component in
LEAPS. Given the benign dataset and mixed dataset with assigned weights, our goal
is to learn an accurate binary classifier from these training data. This classifier will
be used to distinguish malicious events from benign ones in the unseen testing data.
We build two binary classification models for comparison. The first is purely based
on the system-level function call graph (with no statistical learning) and the second
uses WSVM. We discuss their strengths and weaknesses separately and compare the
results quantitatively in the evaluation section.
3.4.1 Decision Model Based on System-level Call Graph
System-level behaviors, such as functions from shared libraries and the OS ker-
nel, represent the interactions between applications and their underlying execution
environment. These features are widely adopted in anomaly detection systems to
reveal aberrant execution of the application. Conceptually similar to existing system
behavior based classification systems [23, 24], we build our first classification model
based on the system-level function call graph (built from the system stack trace in
the system event log). From the benign/mixed system stack trace, we extract the
function invocation chain from the stack trace of each event. Thus we can build the
two system-level function call graphs, the benign call graph (BCG) and mixed call
graph (MCG), separately. We use the former as the positive model and the latter
as the negative model. In the Testing Phase, we extract the call relations from the
stack trace in the testing data and check them in both the BCG and MCG. We make
a classification decision for each individual event based on the existence of such call
relations in both call graphs.
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From the results presented in Chapter 5, we find that the hit rates are low for
classifying benign testing data for all datasets. The first reason for this is that the
system-level call graph model is not able to classify data points that do not appear
in the training set. The second reason is that the stack traces of benign events may
exist in both the BCG and MCG, which make it difficult for the model to accurately
predict their classes.
Furthermore, we find that in some specific datasets (e.g., chrome reverse https
and chrome reverse tcp), the hit rates are also low for classifying malicious testing
data. We manually check the events that lead to this problem. The main cause
is that some outlier points may greatly affect the classification decision. To give a
specific example, consider a kernel function invoked by both benign and malicious
code. Assume the benign code only calls the function once and the malicious code
calls it 1000 times, the corresponding function invocation edges in both call graphs
will be the same. Thus the call graphs cannot yield any information of the invocation
frequency. Further assume that this function invocation appears in the testing data.
From a statistical perspective, this invocation is likely to be from the malicious code,
but it will be classified as “undecidable” by the call graph model.
3.4.2 Weighted Support Vector Machine
Considering the limitations of the call graph model above, we design a more
sophisticated binary classification model based on statistical learning. There are
multiple machine learning techniques for learning binary classifiers, such as Logistic
Regression (LR) [25], SVM [26], and Decision Tree [27]. Due to the discriminative
classification power of SVM and its popularity, we use SVM to build our classification
model. Furthermore, to incorporate the weights assigned to the training data, we
employ a Weighted SVM method in this work to find an optimal classifier by taking
the confidence of each data point into consideration.
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Suppose there are n training data points from both the benign and mixed datasets,
denoted D = {(xi, yi, ci), i = 1, . . . , n} where xi is the feature generated from data
preprocessing for the i-th data point and yi is its binary label. We treat the benign
data as positive samples, while the mixed data are viewed as negative samples, i.e.,
yi = 1 for the benign data and yi = −1 for the mixed data. ci corresponds to the
weight. Note that the weight ci is a real value between 0 and 1. For the benign data,
the weight is simply 1. For the mixed data, we obtain the weight from the weight
assessment in Section 3.3. The purpose of the Weighted SVM is to learn a classifier
w, which can accurately distinguish benign data from malicious data. We give the








Txi ≥ 1− ξi
ξi ≥ 0
(3.2)
here ξi is the classification error of the i-th data point. w
Txi is the prediction score of
xi based on the classifier w, i.e., the larger the value, the more likely xi is benign. The
term
∑
i ciξi in the objective function is the total classification loss/error weighted
by the importance of the data, which we are trying to minimize. The term ‖w‖2 is
the regularizer on the classifier to avoid the overfitting problem [25], which is widely
adopted in statistical machine learning applications. λ is the trade-off parameter
to balance the two terms. The constraint enforces that the prediction of the data
point, wTxi, is consistent with its label yi. For example, for a benign point with label
yi = 1, if the classifier’s output, w
Txi, is negative, then the model will incur a large
classification error ξi due to this constraint.
Based on the generalized representer theorem [28], the minimizer to the optimiza-












Figure 3.4. An illustration of the classifiers learned by the original SVM
model and the Weighted SVM model.
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where k(xi, xj) is a kernel function defined on the feature space. We use a Gaussian
Kernel, k(xi, xj) = exp(−‖xi−xj‖
2
σ2
), in this work, and σ2 is the radius parameter.












s.t. 0 ≤ αi ≤ λci
(3.4)
The above optimization problem can be solved efficiently using a quadratic program-
ming solver. By minimizing this objective function, we can achieve an optimal classi-
fier. We illustrate the difference between the original SVM method and the Weighted
SVM method in Figure 3.4. We can see from this figure that the classifier learned
from the original SVM model may misclassify benign points to malicious. The reason
is that a certain amount of mixed data points actually belong to benign events. By
minimizing the classification error on these mislabeled data points, the SVM classifier
does not perform well especially on benign data. On the other hand, by assigning
proper weights via CFG guidance (i.e., decreasing the weights of mislabeled points
and increasing the weights of true malicious points), the classifier learned from the
Weighted SVM distinguishes the benign points from the malicious ones more accu-
rately.
In the Testing Phase, we apply the learned classification model to the testing data






where xt is classified as malicious if yt < 0.
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Algorithm 2 Weight Assessment
Input: funcentry ← compare cfg bcfg ← benign cfg dict
mcfg ← mixed cfg dict memap ← mixed event dict
1: procedure gen cfg density(cfg)
2: for start, endset ∈ cfg.iter() do
3: for end ∈ endset do
4: density array.add(start)
5: density array.add(end)
6: return sort(density array)
7: procedure check cfg(start, end, cfg, level)
8: if start = end ∧ level 6= 0 then
9: return True
10: valueset := cfg.get(start)
11: if valueset.empty() then
12: return False
13: level := level + 1
14: for value ∈ valueset do
15: if check cfg(value, end, cfg, level) then
16: return True
17: return False
18: procedure set weight(eventmap, key, weight, result)
19: if eventmap[key] 6= nil then:
20: for eventnum ∈ eventmap[key] do
21: if result[eventnum] = nil then
22: result[eventnum] := {’weight’:weight, ’number’:1}
23: else
24: number := result[eventnum][’number’]
25: result[eventnum] := {rebalance(weight,number), number+1}
26: procedure estimate weight(addr, density array)
27: addr idx := bisect(density array, addr)
28: mindiff := min(start - density array[addr idx-1], density array[addr idx] - addr)
29: weight := 1 - mindiff/(density array[addr idx] - density array[addr idx-1])
30: return weight
31: procedure compare cfg(bcfg, mcfg, memap)
32: density array := gen cfg density(bcfg)
33: for start, endset ∈ mcfg.iter() do
34: for end ∈ endset do
35: if check cfg(start, end, bcfg) then
36: weight := 1
37: else if within range(start, end, density array) then
38: weight := estimate weight(start, density array)
39: else
40: weight := 0
41: set weight(memap, start+end, weight, result)
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4 IMPLEMENTATION
We leverage the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) [29] framework to log system
events and generate stack walk traces. The ETW framework is a general-purpose
tracing engine equipped in the latest Windows operating systems (first introduced in
Windows 2000). It provides a tracing mechanism to log events triggered in multiple
system layers, from user applications to kernel components. ETW has been widely
adopted by third-party management tools for performance diagnostics. The output
of ETW is an Event Tracing Log (ETL) file, which is the raw input to LEAPS. ETW
allows us to enable stack walking for a selection of system events, e.g., system call,
process/thread creation, image load/unload, file operations, registry tracing, etc. We
parse the raw ETL file to generate a stack-event correlated log. We perform all ETW
logging on a machine with an Intel Core i7 3.40 GHz CPU, 12GB RAM, and Windows
Server 2008 R2 64-bit operating system.
We implement the Stack Partition Module, Data Preprocessing Module, and Con-
trol Flow Graph Inference Module in Python. When grouping the library and function
set in the Data Preprocessing Module, we use the hierarchical clustering implementa-
tion in the clustering package of SciPy1 and choose UPGMA method as the linkage
criterion, i.e., the distance between any two clusters is the mean distance between all
elements of each cluster.
We implement the Supervised Statistical Learning Module under the LIBSVM [26]
framework. LIBSVM2 is an integrated system for support vector classification, regres-
sion and distribution estimation with a wide range of machine learning applications.
The input of the Weighted SVM model is the benign and mixed (with weights) train-




attack detection in our testing data. In our implementation, we use 10-fold cross
validation [25] to tune the model parameter λ and σ2 on the training set.
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5 EVALUATION
In this section, we report our evaluation results on the effectiveness of LEAPS. First
we describe the datasets in our experiments, i.e., the source of the data and the
criteria of data selection. Then we discuss the procedure of our experiments and the
measurements of the evaluation. Finally we examine three representative cases in
detail and present the results of all other cases briefly.
5.1 Dataset
5.1.1 Data Source
We use 21 datasets (Table 5.1) of different combinations of applications, malicious
payloads, and attack methods to evaluate our approach. We categorize the attack
methods into two groups: offline infection (malicious payload embedded in a benign
binary) and online injection (malicious payload injected into a benign process at
runtime). Each dataset consists of three subsets: a) pure benign samples, b) mixed
samples, and c) pure malicious samples.
We obtain pure benign samples by exercising the benign application. Mixed sam-
ples are from profiling either trojaned applications (i.e., offline infection) or tampered
processes (i.e., online injection). Thus mixed samples contain both benign and mali-
cious events. Pure benign samples and mixed samples can be naturally collected in
the real environment. We use them as positive/negative samples for training. As we
mentioned before, because mixed samples contain benign events as noise, classifiers
learned by traditional statistical learning methods are not accurate.
Pure malicious samples are difficult to obtain in a real environment because ma-
licious payloads are always attached to benign applications. For this evaluation, we
25
Table 5.1.
Evaluation result of LEAPS on camouflaged attacks with different attack
method, application and payload type
Name Attack Method Application Payload ACC PPV TPR TNR NPV
winscp reverse tcp Offline Infection WinSCP Reverse TCP Shell 0.932 0.999 0.865 0.999 0.881
winscp reverse https Offline Infection WinSCP Reverse HTTPS Shell 0.927 0.991 0.862 0.992 0.878
chrome reverse tcp Offline Infection Chrome Reverse TCP Shell 0.877 0.998 0.755 0.999 0.803
chrome reverse https Offline Infection Chrome Reverse HTTPS Shell 0.907 0.998 0.815 0.999 0.844
notepad++ reverse tcp Offline Infection Notepad++ Reverse TCP Shell 0.846 0.998 0.693 0.998 0.765
notepad++ reverse https Offline Infection Notepad++ Reverse HTTPS Shell 0.866 0.998 0.733 0.998 0.789
putty reverse tcp Offline Infection Putty Reverse TCP Shell 0.886 0.815 0.998 0.774 0.998
putty reverse https Offline Infection Putty Reverse HTTPS Shell 0.869 0.999 0.739 0.999 0.793
vim reverse tcp Offline Infection Vim Reverse TCP Shell 0.914 0.995 0.832 0.996 0.856
vim reverse https Offline Infection Vim Reverse HTTPS Shell 0.919 0.998 0.839 0.999 0.861
vim codeinject Offline Infection Vim Pwddlg 0.852 0.985 0.715 0.989 0.776
notepad++ codeinject Offline Infection Notepad++ Pwddlg 0.802 0.948 0.639 0.965 0.728
putty codeinject Offline Infection Putty Pwddlg 0.802 0.919 0.661 0.942 0.736
putty reverse tcp online Online Injection Putty Reverse TCP Shell 0.894 0.825 0.999 0.789 0.999
putty reverse https online Online Injection Putty Reverse HTTPS Shell 0.869 0.999 0.738 0.999 0.792
notepad++ reverse tcp online Online Injection Notepad++ Reverse TCP Shell 0.927 0.991 0.861 0.992 0.877
notepad++ reverse https online Online Injection Notepad++ Reverse HTTPS Shell 0.845 0.998 0.690 0.999 0.763
vim reverse tcp online Online Injection Vim Reverse TCP Shell 0.963 0.933 0.998 0.928 0.998
vim reverse https online Online Injection Vim Reverse HTTPS Shell 0.919 0.995 0.842 0.996 0.863
winscp reverse tcp online Online Injection WinSCP Reverse TCP Shell 0.950 0.996 0.904 0.996 0.912
winscp reverse https online Online Injection WinSCP Reverse HTTPS Shell 0.921 0.998 0.843 0.998 0.864
manually extract the malicious payloads and recompile them as independent mal-
ware. Here we only use pure malicious samples as the ground truth for testing to
verify the effectiveness of our binary classifier on negative samples. After hierarchical
clustering, each subset contains three features: Event Type, Lib, and Func.
5.1.2 Data Selection
We select the training data for learning a binary classifier from: a) pure benign
samples (positive training samples) and b) mixed samples (negative training samples).
We select the testing data from: a) pure benign samples (positive testing samples)
and c) pure malicious samples (negative testing samples). To avoid training and
testing on the same benign samples, we divide the pure benign samples into two non-
overlapping parts, 50% for training and 50% for testing. Taking the order of adjacent
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events into account, we increase the dimensions from 3 up to 30 by coalescing each
10 consecutive samples into one 30-dimension data point. Due to the large number
of data samples, we randomly select 20% of the samples from each dataset to form
the training and testing sets. In this way, we can achieve reasonable running time for
the training phase and also near-complete coverage of the behavior in each dataset.
5.2 Evaluation Procedure and Measurement of Effectiveness
We compare our CFG guided Weighted SVM approach (denoted WSVM in Fig-
ure 5.1 and 5.2) with the other two classification approaches, i.e., approaches based
on the system-level call graph (denoted CGraph in Figure 5.1 and 5.2) and tradi-
tional SVM, on all 21 datasets. We set the model parameters λ and σ2 using 10-fold
cross validation on the training set. To eliminate fluctuation caused by the random
selection of the training and testing sets, we average all results over 10 runs.
We measure the performance of the classification results based on: True Positives
(TP), True Negatives (TN), False Positives (FP), and False Negatives (FN). TP
indicates actual benign samples that are correctly classified as benign. Similarly, TN
represents malicious samples that are correctly classified as malicious. FP indicates
malicious samples that are misclassified as benign. FN represents benign samples
that are misclassified as malicious. Based on these four results, we evaluate the
performance of the different methods by five measurements: 1) Accuracy (ACC),
2) Positive Predictive Value (PPV or Precision), 3) True Positive Rate (TPR or




By definition, the ACC is the portion of the true results (both TP and TN) in
the total test samples.
ACC =
TP + TN
TP + FP + FN + TN
(5.1)
According to Figure 5.1 and 5.2, the ACCs of all applications elevate by varying
degrees when using WSVM compared to SVM and CGraph. For example, the ACC
of winscp reverse https online increases from 59.9% (CGraph) to 92.1% (WSVM),
which reflects a significant improvement on the overall hit rate of both benign and
malicious prediction.
Though ACC indicates the overall performance of a binary classification, it may
yield misleading results if the data set is unbalanced. Thus, we introduce four other
measurements based on the confusion matrix (TP, TN, FP, FN) to give a more com-
prehensive evaluation of the experimental results.
5.2.2 Positive Predictive Value
Also known as precision, PPV measures the portion of actual benign samples in





As seen from Figure 5.1 and 5.2, WSVM produces the highest PPV values. For
instance, the PPV s of putty reverse tcp online are 71.2% (CGraph), 79.6% (SVM)
and 82.5% (WSVM).
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5.2.3 True Positive Rate
Also known as recall, TPR measures the number of instances that are correctly





The TPR of WSVM has obvious improvement on all 21 cases. For example, in
Figure 5.2, putty reverse https online has a TPR increase from 41.7% (CGraph) to
56.4% (SVM) and reaches 73.8% (WSVM).
5.2.4 True Negative Rate
True Negative Rate is also known as specificity. Similar to TPR, TNR calculates,
out of the instances that are actually malicious, the number of instances that are





From Figure 5.1, the TNR of vim codeinject increases from 67.9% (CGraph) to
98.9%(WSVM). It can be easily verified that this improvement applies to other 20
cases according to Figure 5.1 and 5.2.
5.2.5 Negative Predictive Value
Similar to PPV, NPV measures the portion of the actually malicious samples out





Again, WSVM ranks the highest in all 21 applications in terms of NPV. For in-
stance, the NPV of putty reverse https online increases from 69.9% (SVM) to 79.2%
(WSVM), as seen in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.1. Results comparing LEAPS (WSVM) with system-level call
graph and SVM for offline infection detection
5.3 Results and Discussion
Figure 5.1 and 5.2 show the results of the offline infection and online injection
datasets respectively. We also present the detailed results of all datasets in Table 5.1.
From these figures, we can see that the proposed CFG guided Weighted SVM method
achieves the best results on all measurements in all cases. In the rest of this section,
we discuss three representative cases in detail.
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Figure 5.2. Results comparing LEAPS (WSVM) with system-level call
graph and SVM for online injection detection
5.3.1 Case Study I — winscp reverse tcp
This attack is in the offline infection category. The adversary can choose an
arbitrary benign application binary and transform it into a trojaned application.
They can implant the malicious payload into the binary and detour the program path
at some specific location to trigger the payload. The payload may create a persistent
backdoor and wait for a command from the remote adversary. After the adversary
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creates the backdoor, the trojaned program returns back to the normal control flow
of the benign application. Legitimate users cannot detect that the remote hacker has
already controlled their machine when the trojaned application is running.
In this case, we leverage the tools and payloads in the Metasploit Framework [31]
to generate the trojaned application. Metasploit Framework is a widely-adopted
system for developing and executing exploit code to perform penetration testing.
Msfpayload is a command-line tool for generating different types of shellcode in the
Metasploit Framework. We use this tool to generate a Meterpreter, a dynamically
extensible payload that uses in-memory DLL injection stagers. The Meterpreter
communicates with the remote server via a reverse TCP connection. It enables the
remote adversary to perform all kinds of hacking operations on a victim system, e.g.,
keylogging, file uploading, taking screenshots, password hash collection, etc. The
benign host application in this case is WinSCP. We leverage Msfencode to encode the
payload with shikata ga nai (a polymorphic XOR additive feedback encoder) three
times and then embed it into the WinSCP binary.
We can see from the results that all five measurements increase if we use the
WSVM model. Take ACC and TPR for instance, we can see from Figure 5.1 that
these two measurements based on the call graph model are 74.79% and 68.16%.
ACC and TPR increase to 85.81% and 72.08% if we use traditional non-weighted
SVM. Our Weighted SVM approach shows even better classification effectiveness
compared to the SVM method. For example, ACC and TPR increase to 93.2% and
86.5%. These comparisons demonstrate the superior performance of our proposed
CFG guided Weighted SVM approach.
5.3.2 Case Study II — vim codeinject
This case is also in the offline infection category, but the infection technique and
the payload are different. We choose the hacking tool Codeinject [32] to inject a
password dialog into a portable executable, in this case Vim is the host application.
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When the user starts Vim, a password dialog will be popped up asking for the pass-
word, which is pre-set when the trojaned binary is generated. If the user does not
know the password, Vim exits silently.
From Figure 5.1, we can see that vim codeinject increases in all five measurements
for each classification model. For instance, ACCs for CGraph, SVM and WSVM
are 35.5%, 72.5% and 85.2%. Another measurement, NPVs for CGraph, SVM and
WSVM are 51.8%, 64.6% and 78.2%, respectively.
5.3.3 Case Study III — putty reverse https online
This case is in the online injection category. In the event that there is some
unpatched vulnerability in the target system, an adversary may craft some shellcode
and perform a remote exploitation to run the shellcode. In order to stay persistent
in the system, after taking control of the system, the adversaries can choose a long-
running process and inject a backdoor payload into its memory space. They first
allocate a memory slot for the backdoor payload and then remotely create a thread
to run the code in parallel with the benign code. In this case, we also leverage the
Metasploit Framework to take over the target system. Then the adversary runs the
script of post/windows/manage/payload inject to inject the Meterpreter payload into
the memory of a running Putty. Then the adversary can connect to the Meterpreter
payload in the Putty instance through a reverse HTTPS connection.
We can see from Figure 5.2 that the ACC, PPV, TPR, TNR, and NPV for WSVM
are the highest, which is consistent with our observation in the Case Study I and II.
For example, the corresponding ACCs for the three methods are 69.22%, 78.25% and
86.86%, and their respective TPRs are 41.2%, 56.1% and 73.8%.
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6 DISCUSSION
In this section, we examine the limitations of LEAPS and propose potential solutions
to address these problems. In addition, we discuss some future research opportunities
in the area of attack detection by bridging program analysis and machine learning
based techniques.
6.1 Source-level Trojaned Applications
LEAPS currently targets camouflaged attacks against binary applications, which
indicates that the relative offsets of the benign code will not change. However, imagine
that the adversary has obtained the source code of this benign application. He or
she could add the source code of the malicious payload into the original code base,
recompile the program, and deliver the trojaned application to the victim.
For closed-source software, only internal developers of the software vendors can
intentionally conduct such trojan implanting attacks. For software in the open-source
community, each line of the committed source code will be open to public inspection,
which makes such attacks more difficult. Assuming there exist such malicious vendors
or negligent maintainers, currently LEAPS is not able to assign correct weights in the
mixed dataset because the CFG itself has been modified.
In order to address this limitation, we need to generalize our CFG comparison
algorithm. For trojaned applications, assuming that the adversaries do not change the
functionality of the original benign software (they just implant the payload’s source
code), the general structure of the benign subgraph in the CFG will not change. In
light of this, instead of conducting exact matching, we could search for isomorphic
subgraphs in both benign/mixed CFGs by identifying and aligning pivotal nodes. We
consider this as our future work to improve LEAPS.
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6.2 Future Work in Learning
LEAPS employs a Weighted SVM model to distinguish malicious events from
benign ones. As shown in the experimental results, LEAPS achieves reasonably
good performance on camouflaged attack detection, and consistently outperforms ap-
proaches based on system-level call graph and pure SVM. However, LEAPS only takes
the order of adjacent events into account. But in real scenarios, there may exist some
causal relations between multiple events dispersed far away (temporally) in the log.
Therefore, we plan to explore more machine learning techniques, such as conditional




Host-based anomaly detection and malware classification systems are well-researched
in recent years. The general procedure of these approaches is to extract the execution
abstraction from a subject program, build a model, and use this model to make
decisions on future data.
Some systems are based on the assumption that source code or binary is available
for analysis, thus they are able to derive a precise model to represent the program’s
execution. Wagner et al. [1] define a model of expected application behavior through
static analysis of its source code, and then check the system call trace for compliance
at runtime. Giffin et al. [2,3] introduce the Dyck model, based on static binary anal-
ysis, to include program instrumentation on the binary to facilitate efficient runtime
monitoring. DOME [4] first identifies the locations of system calls within the exe-
cutables using static analysis, and then verify at runtime that each observed system
call is invoked from its legitimate call site. SMIT [33] is a malware indexing system
that leverages an executable’s function-call graphs to cluster malware. Kruegel et
al. [34] propose extracting CFGs from worm executables embedded in the network
stream to identify structural similarities among polymorphic worms. In real-world
scenarios, source code or executables may not always be available for training. Fur-
thermore, obfuscated executables and complexity of binary disassembly render static
analysis difficult to build accurate models. In comparison, LEAPS does not require
static analysis or instrumentation of application source or binary code. We model the
execution of the program only by analyzing the system event log and infer its CFG
to guide statistical learning.
Some researchers also propose black-box or gray-box approaches to infer the execu-
tion model without static analysis. For example, Sekar et al. [6] propose an approach
to generate a deterministic FSA by monitoring the normal program executions at
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runtime, thus avoiding static analysis on source code. Gao et al. [7] propose a gray-
box approach that builds execution graphs based on system call sequences and does
not require static analysis. Feng et al. [8] propose extracting return addresses from
the call stack to build a model of abstract execution path and use the model to de-
tect exploits. LEAPS shares the methodology of dynamically deriving the program
execution model. Yet it is among the first efforts to leverage the inferred execution
models to refine statistical learning models by pruning noisy training datasets.
Statistical learning techniques are also widely adopted in anomaly detection re-
search. Such techniques have the advantage of being robust in processing incomplete
training data, thus they can usually achieve better classification results. The input of
these systems is based on the interaction between the applications and OS (e.g., sys-
tem call sequence, system state change, and access activities). For example, Hofmeyr
et al. [11] propose to characterize normal behaviors of a program in terms of system
call sequences, thus they can detect an anomalous execution if it produces aberrant
system call sequences. Wespi et al. [12] leverage Teiresias, an algorithm for discov-
ering patterns in unaligned biological sequences, to build a table of variable-length
patterns of audit events. Lee et al. [9, 10] leverage data mining techniques to find
patterns of system features that describe program behavior. Bailey et al. [23] develop
a classification technique that categorizes malware behavior in terms of system state
changes, rather than from system call patterns. Lanzi et al. [35] demonstrate that
malware detectors based on system call sequence may not be effective in real-world
scenarios and build a model based on access activities on files and the registry.
Recently, some researchers introduce more sophisticated machine learning mod-
els, such as HMM and SVM, to assist classification. Warrender et al. [13] compare
four anomaly detection models based on the system call dataset and conclude that
HMM achieves the best accuracy on average, but with high computational costs.
Gao et al. [36] propose the concept of behavioral distance to compare the differences
of process’ behaviors on different platforms based on system calls invoked. In sub-
sequent work [14], they also introduce HMM to measure the behavior distance to
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better account for system call orderings. Heller et al. [16] use a one-class SVM to
perform training on a dataset of normal registry accesses and then detect anomalous
registry behavior in the testing data. Kolter et al. [37] use n-grams of byte codes
from benign/malicious executables as features and evaluate them on a variety of in-
ductive methods to train the classification model. Rieck et al. [15] extract behavior
of malware in a sandbox environment and use SVM to learn the classification model
for discriminating malware types. Bayer et al. [38] leverage locality sensitive hashing
to perform unsupervised clustering based on the malware’s behavior extracted in a
controlled environment. Khan et al. [17] present a study on using hierarchical clus-
tering analysis for enhancing the training time of SVM, especially for dealing with
large data sets in intrusion detection. Eskin [39] also recognizes the existence of noisy
training datasets. His solution is to first learn a distribution probability over train-
ing data and then apply a statistical test to detect anomalies. LEAPS also adopts
SVM as the statistical learning model. However, different from these efforts that are
purely based on learning, LEAPS leverages the inferred CFGs as guidance to prune




Camouflaged attacks implant malicious payloads into benign applications and exe-
cute concurrently under the cover of a legitimate application process. This causes
traditional program analysis based and statistical learning based detection systems
to generate a misleading decision boundary due to noisy training data because of
the interleaving of benign and malicious behavior. In this thesis, we present LEAPS,
a new attack detection system based on a supervised statistical learning model to
classify benign and malicious system events. Different from existing approaches,
LEAPS leverages CFGs inferred from system event logs as guidance to automati-
cally refine noisy training data, leading to a more accurate classification model for
camouflaged attack detection. We have conducted extensive evaluation on a range
of real-world attacks with offline and online camouflaging strategy. Our experimen-
tal results demonstrate that LEAPS can effectively improve classification accuracy
compared to traditional learning and call graph based models. LEAPS shows the fea-
sibility of combating camouflaged attacks by bridging machine learning and program
analysis. However, advanced persistence threats (APT) involves not only camou-
flaged attacks but also other wide spectrum of intrusion strategies and payloads. In
the long term, My research aims at defeating general APT attack, and my current
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